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E l e c t r o n i c  C o m m e r c e  
ELECTRONIC COMMERC 
"TOWARDS A EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL 
SIGNATURES AND ENCRYPTION" 
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TAKES A STEP FORWARD FOR CONFIDENTIAL AND 
SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS, 
Rosa Julia-Barcel6 and Thomas Vinje 
The growth of electronic communication depends on the ability of electronic messages to be confidential and 
secure. The need for confidentiality and security exists in a great variety of electronic communications, includ- 
ing, for example, electronic contracts (both business-to-business and business-to-consumer), electronic tax 
declarations, and electronic medical records. As described below, the main technological tools for ensuring the 
confidentiality and security of electronic communications are digital signature methods and encryption. 
On 8 October 1997, the European Commission took a step towards establishing a European framework for dig- 
ital signatures and encryption by issuing a Communication entitled "Ensuring Security and Trust in Electronic 
Communication: Towards a European Framework for Digital Signatures and Encryption". 1 The Communication 
is divided into three sections. First, it deals with the elaboration of a framework governing the entities that 
issue the certificates establishing the basis for digital signatures (so-called certification authorities) and the 
legal recognition of digital signatures. Second, it addresses encryption, including export control measures and 
law enforcement requirements. Finally, the Communication discusses the legal basis for a Commission initia- 
tive in these areas and the scope and timeframe of such an initiative. 
After providing an introduction to the relevant technology, this article will provide a brief description and analy- 
sis of the main topics discussed by the Communication, focusing particularly on digital signatures and certifi- 
cation authorities. 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TECHNOLOGY 
Both 'digital signatures' and 'encryption'  are based upon cryp- 
tographic technology, lndeed, a digital signature is essentially 
an encrypted message accompanying an electronic docu- 
ment. However, as described below, digital signatures and 
encryption have different functions and usually are based on 
different types of cryptographic techniques. 
'Encryption' 
As used in the Communication, 'encryption '  is the term 
employed to describe the symmetric-key systems used to 
achieve the confidentiality of electronic communications. By 
exchanging messages encrypted using symmetric cryptosys- 
terns (described below), communicating parties seek to 
ensure that they (and only they) will he able to read the con- 
tent of the messages. 
With symmetric-key systems, both sender and recipient 
use the same 'key' to encrypt  and decrypt  messages: the 
sender encrypts  a message with the symmetric key and 
sends it to the recipient, who possesses the same key and 
who will use it to decrypt the message (i.e. return it 
to plaintext). In order tbr the communicat ions  to remain 
confidential, the key must remain secret. This means the 
parties must have a secure way to exchange the key. As 
the Communicat ion notes, this is cumbersome in an open 
environment  where many participants do not know one 
another. 
Although the Communication uses the term ~encryption' 
to describe only systems using symmetric-key systems, it is 
also possible, as described below, to achieve cont]dentiality of 
communications using asymmetric cryptograph3: 
'Digital signature' technology 
Whereas encryption,  as that term is employed in the 
Communication, is used to achieve confidentiality, digital sig- 
nature technology is used to achieve integrity, and authentici- 
ty of the data, i.e. security of electronic communications. By 
using digital signature technology, the recipient of an elec- 
tronic communication can be confident that the sender of 
the communication is actually who they purport  to be (this is 
often referred to as the 'authenticity' function of digital signa- 
tures). The communicating parties can also ensure that the 
communication received is the one that actually was sent 
(this is often referred to as the 'integrity' function of digital 
signatures). 
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Digital signature technology is based on asymmetric cryp- 
tosystems, where different keys are used for encryption and 
decryption. With asymmetric systems, each party is allocated 
two different keys. One key is used to transform certain data 
into a seemingly unintelligible form.That data is attached to an 
electronic document, and it effectively constitutes the 'digital 
signature' itself. Another key is used to verify a digital signature 
by returning that data to its original, intelligible form. In other 
words, the sender of an electronic communication 'signs' it dig- 
Rally by attaching to it certain data encrypted using one key 
(much like the author of a traditional paper document signs it 
by afftxing his handwritten signature to iO.The recipient of the 
electronic document ensures the validity of the digital signa- 
ture by decrypting the data using another key. 
The key used for creating the digital signature - -  the sig- 
nature key - -  is called the 'private key', because it is available 
only to the signer. Unless the key has been stolen or other- 
wise compromised, nobody else has access to this private 
key, and hence nobody else can digitally sign a message in the 
same way. 
The second, signature verification key is called the 'public 
key' because usually it is made available to the general public, 
for example through a directory of public keys. This key, 
when applied to digital signatures created by the key holder's 
individual private key, will decrypt those signatures - -  and 
only those signatures.Thus, the public key will not recognize 
the digital signature of any other person. 
Because a particular public key can verify only digital sig- 
natures created using its holder's private key, and because 
(absent compromise of the key) the sender of a message is 
the only possessor of the private key, the recipient of a mes- 
sage who successfully verifies its accompanying digital signa- 
ture using the sender's public key can be confident that the 
message is authentic, i.e. that it was sent by the person who 
purported to send it. Moreover, after applying the public key 
to the encrypted message, the recipient can compare the 
resulting text with the plaintext included in the message. If 
they are the same, the recipient can also be confident about 
the integrity of the message (i.e. that the message has not 
been altered in transit). 
In most public key techniques, a one-way algorithm (a so- 
called hash algorithm) is applied to an electronic message to 
produce a condensed version of it.This condensed version of 
the message (the 'message digest') is then 'signed' (encrypt- 
ed) with the sender's private key. In effect, this encrypted 
message digest is itseff the 'digital signature'. 
Because the hashing method is a one-way function, the 
message digest cannot be reversed by the recipient to obtain 
the full message itself. Therefore, the encrypted message 
digest (the digital signature) is accompanied by the full text 
of the message in unencrypted form. Upon receipt, the recip- 
ient processes the unencrypted message text with the same 
hashing algorithm as was used to create the message digest, 
and compares the resulting message digest with the original 
one the sender sent along with the message (which, of 
course, the recipient has decrypted using the sender's public 
key). If the unencrypted  message was altered in any way dur- 
ing the transit, the two digests will be different, thus reveal- 
ing that alterations were made. 2 
With respect to the authenticity of a message, the recipi- 
ents can be confident about the identity of the sender only if 
they are confident that the private key remains in the sole 
possession of the person with whom they believe they are 
communicating and that the party with whom they are com- 
municating is actually the one he purports to be.Thus, the 
key system must allow the recipient of an electronic com- 
munication to ensure that the private key has not been com- 
promised. For example, a pharmacy must be able easily to 
check whether  a physician's private key has been stolen or 
otherwise compromised before filling an electronic pre- 
scription issued by that physician. Moreover, it is often 
important for the system to allow a recipient of an electron- 
ic communicat ion to ensure not only that the party with 
whom the recipient is communicating is really the one they 
are believed to be, but also that they have certain character- 
istics. For example, a pharmacy may need to establish that 
the holder of a particular key is actually a physician before 
accepting his digital signature on an electronic medical 
prescription. As described below, both of these objectives 
can be established through the activities of certification 
authorities. 
It is common practice to include the public key along 
with an electronic communication. However, this approach 
does not provide sufficient cotlfidence about the integrity of 
the private key. Although the recipient can use a public key 
accompanying the communication to decrypt the signature, 
the only way to gain real confidence in the digital signature is 
to retrieve the public key from a trustworthy database and to 
decrypt the digital signature using that public key. The fact 
that a public key is included along with a communication, 
and that it can be used to decrypt the digital signature, does 
not, after all, mean that the private key remains in the sole 
possession of the proper key holder. 
As described below, this highlights one of the more 
important functions of certification authorities, namely the 
establishment and maintenance of key databases. By issuing 
certificates to key holders and by creating and updating key 
databases, certification authorities play an essential role in 
establishing a trustworthy system whereby message recipi- 
ents can verify the integrity of the private key and the charac- 
teristics of the key holder. 
Thus, the digital signature fulfils the same basic authentic- 
ity and integrity functions as the manual signature. Indeed, 
with a well-structured and managed public and private key 
system using secure algorithms and sufficient key lengths, it is 
virtually impossible to tamper with a digital signature, so the 
digital signature is actually far more reliable than the manual 
signature. ~ A system of commerce based on electronic docu- 
ments and digital signatures thus has the potential to provide 
more security than ever before. 
As noted above, asymmetric cryptography can be used 
not only to achieve authenticity and integrity through digital 
signature technology, but also confidentiality. Indeed, elec- 
tronic communications accompanied by digital signatures are 
often encrypted using the public key of the recipient. Thus, 
the recipient - -  and only the recipient - -  can use his private 
key to decrypt the communication. 
The role of certification authorities 
As noted above, the trustworthiness of digital signatures, and 
thus their value in electronic commerce, lies in the reliability 
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of  the keys. In an open environment,  the requisite reliability 
of keys can be achieved mainly through the establishment of 
a legal regime governing independent  'certification authori- 
ties' who provide (1) the necessary assurances of identity by 
issuing certificates binding public keys to the identity of their 
owners and (2) the requisite confidence that keys have not 
been compromised through the establishment of a trustwor- 
thy database maintaining an up-to-date list of valid keys. 4 
In order to provide confidence to communicating parties 
about the identity and characteristics of a key holder, the cer- 
tification authority must obtain and verify certain information 
for the certificate. For example, a physician applying for a cer- 
tificate must provide an adequate demonstration of his per- 
sonal identity and of his status as a licensed physician. After 
obtaining and verifying such information, the certification 
authority creates a certificate containing, inter alia, the 
party's public key, 5 the identity of the key owner, a serial 
number, and the identity of the certification authority.Then, a 
hash function is applied to this information and it is signed by 
the certification authority with its private key.This 'signature' 
is then attached to the same information in unencrypted 
form in order to form the complete certificate.Thus, the cer- 
tificate has two parts: the unencrypted,  full-text information, 
and the digital signature of the certification authority. 
Such certificates enable  communica t ing  parties to 
achieve confidence about the identity and status of the par- 
ties with whom they communicate as follows: when  Party A 
enters into a transaction with Party B by sending Party B a 
message digitally signed by Party A, he also sends along with 
the message the certificate issued by the certification author- 
ity. Because the certificate contains Party A's public key, 
signed by the certification authority, and because the certifi- 
cation authority's public key will always be available in a pub- 
lic database, Party B can use the certification authority's 
public key to verify the certificate sent along with the mes- 
sage by Party A, thus enabling Part 3" B to verify Party A's 
message. 
As noted above, the second main function of certification 
authorities is to provide confidence that keys remain valid.To 
do so, they must establish a reliable key database, including a 
certificate revocation list. This is a list indicating certificates 
that are no longer valid because, for example, the private key 
has been stolen or otherwise compromised.Thus, when some- 
one receives an electronic communication purportedly signed 
by a particular person, he can confirm, by reviewing the certifi- 
cate revocation list, that the certificate remains valid. 
ESTABLISHING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES 
At present, certification services are offered in Europe by only 
a few private companies active in the field of computer  secu- 
rity and whose establishment and operation is not subject to 
any legal framework. 6 Because certification authorities will 
have a vital role to play in establishing a reliable system for 
electronic commerce based on digital signature technology, 
the growth of this sector will depend on the adoption of an 
appropriate, albeit not overly bureaucratic, legal regime that 
will generate trust in the activities of certification authorities. 
To the extent the legal regime engenders more trust in 
certification authorities and the use of digital signatures, for 
example by providing greater evidentiary value to electronic 
documents accompanied by digital certificates, electronic 
commerce in general will be encouraged. Moreover, cross- 
border electronic commerce will flourish only if certificates 
issued in one Member State are recognized in all other 
Member States and if the legal regimes governing the activi- 
ties of certification authorities are reasonably harmonized. 
The creation of an appropriate legal regime governing the 
establishment and operation of certification authorities 
would have other favourable consequences. It could provide 
a basis for the growth of electronic commerce in a global con- 
text, beyond the borders of Europe, and provide appropriate 
consumer protection in the context of certification services. 
The Communication addresses three especially timely 
questions with respect to certification authorities: 
• How can the EU-wide legal recognition and trustworthi- 
ness of digital certificates be established? 
• Should the legal framework governing the establishment 
and operation of certification authorities be based upon 
a licensing system or a non-licensing system, or both? 
• What liability regime should govern the activities of cer- 
tification authorities? 
How to achieve the EU-wide recognition 
and trustworthiness of digital certificates? 
The Communication suggests that the establishment of an 
EU-wide legal framework providing certain basic require- 
ments for the establishment and operation of certification 
authorities would provide the basis for requiring the mutual 
recognition of certificates among Member States. In other 
words, once such a common legal framework is established, a 
certificate issued in one Member State would have to be rec- 
ognized in all other Member States.The Communication pro- 
vides some examples of fields where common requirements 
could be specified, including: 
• security of the certification authority and compliance 
with data protection legislation; 
• reliable identification of certificate applicants (to ensure 
that applicants are properly identified); 
• minimum insurance coverage (to (;over cases where the 
certification authority is liable, for example, for misidenti- 
fying a certificate applicant); 
• technical obligations (for example, to ensure that the 
applicant's private and public keys employ adequate, up- 
to-date, encryption technology), and 
• qualifications and security-testing of personnel. 
It would seem that the areas identified by the 
Communication for possible inclusion in a Community legisla- 
tive instrument governing certification authorities are, in gener- 
al, appropriate matters for such legislation to address - -  
although it would be wise also to consider legislation for achiev- 
ing interoperabtlity between certification authorities. Moreover, 
the goal of establishing a harmonized regime setting minimum 
criteria for the establishment and operation of certification 
authorities, and the application of the mutual recognition prin- 
ciple to certificates issued by authorities complying with such a 
regime, is a laudable one. In addition, the Communication 
seems to suggest the establishment of a flexible regime that 
would permit room for experimentation in this new area, avoid- 
ing the creation of heavy bureaucratic obligations. 
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Should this legal framework be based on a 
licensing system, non-licensing system, or 
both? 
One of the key questions to be addressed in connection with 
creating a harmonized regime for the establishment and oper- 
ation of certification authorities is whether certification 
authorities would have to be licensed, and whether a Member 
State requiring licensing would have to accept certificates 
issued by a non-licensed authority in a Member State having 
no licensing obligation. As the Communication indicates, 
some Member States are now in the process of introducing 
voluntary schemes for the establishment and operation of 
certification authorities, while others regard mandatory 
licensing schemes as essential to the building of trust in certi- 
fication authorities and digital signatures. 7 
The Communication accepts that licensing regimes might 
be appropriate. However, it also accepts the possibility of 
non-licensing approaches. Indeed, it says: "Licensing is only 
one of the possible trust-enhancing methods Member States 
may apply to promote the use of legally valid digital signa- 
tures, Non-licensed, but highly regarded private or public 
organizations may as well be considered as a trusted CA." 
Thus, the Communication concludes that the EU regime 
governing certification authorities should allow for"the coex- 
istence of licensed and non-licensed CAs". It is not clear pre- 
cisely what this coexistence would entail, but it seems that a 
Member State with a licensing system would have to accept 
certificates issued by non-licensed authorities from Member 
States without licensing systems. However, authorities in all 
Member States would have to comply with the minimum cri- 
teria governing certificate authorities' establishment and 
operation provided for in the EU legislation. 
The Communicat ion 's  'coexistence '  approach would 
seem to be a wise one. Given the infancy of this area of busi- 
ness, flexibility should be provided for experimentation. For 
example, it might be appropriate to limit licensing obligations 
only to those certification authorities providing services to 
the public (as suggested for the UK) and for closed user 
groups to be exempted from any licensing requirement. The 
fundamental goal should be to establish a balance between 
imposing sufficient legal obligations on the establishment 
and operation of certification authorities to engender trust in 
the use of digital signature technology, while allowing scope 
for technology and business practices to develop. 
Which liability regime should apply? 
The Communication says, correctly, that having "clear liability 
rules would contribute to the acceptance of CA services". 
However, the Communication fails to define clearly the stan- 
dard it envisions for liability. In addressing liability issues, one 
should distinguish among the following actors: (1) the certifi- 
cate-holder; (2) the certification authority; and (3) the third 
party who receives (and relies upon) the certificate. 
With respect to the certification authority's potential lia- 
bility to the certificate holder, who presumably will have a 
contractual relationship, the Communication seems to indi- 
cate that the certification authority's standard of liability will 
depend on the terms of the contract. The Communication 
goes on to indicate that a "catalogue of requirements" could 
form the basis of the contractual duties, providing both mini- 
mum and maximum liability of the certification authority. 
However, the Communication does not indicate which 
requirements this 'catalogue' might contain, nor whether this 
catalogue would be binding by law, nor whether the legal 
regime governing certification authorities might prohibit the 
contractual exclusion of liability in certain circumstances, 
perhaps as a matter of consumer protection. For example, 
should a certification authority that fails to publish the revo- 
cation of a certificate after proper notice by the certificate 
holder of the theft of his certificate be able to exclude liabili- 
ty for damages incurred by a certificate holder when  his cer- 
tificate is then used by a thief?. 
With respect to extra-contractual liability, both between the 
certification authority and third parties who rely on a certifi- 
cate and between certificate holders and such third parties, the 
Communication is silent. It would seem appropriate for any 
regime governing the operation of certification authorities to 
address this issue, and to establish a liability regime creating an 
appropriate balance between these actors. 
Under usual tort rules, the person who suffered damage in 
reliance on a certificate would bear the burden of demon- 
strating the lack of due care of the certification authority. 
However, given the very specialized technological aspects 
involved in issuing and maintaining a certificate, this burden 
could be exceedingly difficult to meet. Therefore, a solution 
that establishes a reversal of the burden of proof might be 
appropriate. Under this approach, the certification authority 
would have the burden of proving its lack of negligence. 
Perhaps such a reversal of the burden of proof would like- 
wise be appropriate in the context of contract cases between 
certification authorities and certified parties. 
This approach is likely to be adopted by the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
in a new model law on certification authorities to comple- 
ment the Model Law on Electronic Commerce. s The UNCI- 
TRAL draft also proposes a liability presumption, as is 
provided in the Product Liability Directive for defective prod- 
ucts, which can be rebutted by the certification authority by 
showing it has fulfilled certain requirements (for example, by 
demonstrating it acted with diligence in ascertaining the key 
holder's identity). 
The German Digital Signature Act does not provide a spe- 
cial rule on liability; therefore, general rules will apply. 9 To the 
contrary, the UK's Public Consultation Paper suggests that cer- 
tification authorities should be subjected to a strict liability 
regime attenuated only by liability caps on compensation.l° 
One specific issue should be mentioned concerning the 
obligation of the certificate holder, namely the obligation to 
maintain the secrecy of the key and immediately to notify the 
certification authority of any key compromise. Although 
some authors have criticized the notion that the certificate 
holder should bear the risk of loss until such time as it has 
notified the certification authority of a key compromise, ~t 
this would seem to be the only workable method of allocat- 
ing this risk. It would seem inappropriate to impose any lia- 
bility upon the certification authority until it has received 
such notice, though it would, of course, be useful for certifi- 
cation authorities to educate certificate holders about the 
importance of carefully maintaining certificate and key 
integrity. In addition, technological measures, such as smart- 
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cards provided with biometric devices, might reduce the 
risks associated with key and certificate loss and theft. 
LEGAL RECOGNITION OF DIGITAL 
SIGNATURES 
Digital signatures cannot play their  p roper  role in facilitating 
electronic commerce  unless they are legally recognized. In 
other  words, digital signatures must be legally equivalent to 
hand-written signatures before they can become an effective 
business tool. 
Unfortunately, as the Commission points  out  in its 
Communicat ion,  digital signatures are not  yet accorded 
appropria te  legal recognition. EU Member State laws current- 
ly impose requirements of  handwri t ten  signatures and 'writ- 
ten documen t s '  as condi t ions  of  cont rac tua l  validity, 
entbrcabili ty and evidentiary admissibility and weight.  ]2 
These requirements vary from EU Member State to Member 
State, both in their terms and their specific purposes.  
In many legal systems it is common to find a requirement  
that certain contracts or  administrative acts must be in writ- 
ten form and must be authenticated by hand-written signa- 
tures. Under this approach,  for example,  certain contracts are 
invalid or unenforcable unless they are documented  in writ- 
ing and accompanied by a hand-writ ten signature, often for 
consumer  protect ion purposes.  ] 3 In others, documentary  evi- 
dence to which signatures are affixed is accorded more evi- 
dentiary weight than other  forms of  evidence, 14 and it is 
unclear whether  digital signatures will qualify for such 
tavourable treatment.  Moreover, even in countries where  doc- 
umentary evidence is not formally accorded privileged status, 
courts are not always willing to accord the same evidentiary 
value to electronic documents  accompanied by digital signa- 
tures as to their  conventional counterparts  accompanied by 
hand-written signatures. 
Because digital signatures can provide at least the same 
degree of confidence as to the authenticity and integrity of  a 
document  as can their hand-writ ten counterparts ,  this is an 
anachronistic situation. As the Communicat ion notes, "in 
order  to achieve as wide as possible acceptance  of  digital sig- 
natures, national legal systems may need to be adapted to 
ensure that they offer the same recognit ion and treatment to 
digital signatures as conventional signatures". 
In our  view, to facilitate the development  of  electronic 
commerce,  EU harmonization legislation should establish the 
legal recognit ion of  digital signatures. The Communication 
seems to embrace  this proposi t ion,  indicating that the 
Commission intends to undertake an ongoing assessment of 
the need to provide for the legal recognit ion to digital signa- 
tures at Community level, l~ In pursuing this course,  the 
Commission is following in the footsteps of several interna- 
tional organizations that have suggested steps be taken to 
accord appropr ia te  legal recognit ion to new authentication 
and integrity mechanisms (e.g. UNCITRAL, Tedis Programme, 
Council of  Europe, and Working Party 4 on Facilitation of  
In ternat ional  Trade Procedures  of  the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe). i(, 
As the Communicat ion correctly points out, any such 
legal regime should be sufficiently flexible to anticipate 
future technological developments.  While it should accord 
today's digital signatures the same recognit ion as convention- 
al signatures, it should adopt  a technological ly neutral 
approach that would apply also to new means of  providing 
authentication and integrity. Indeed, the law should not pro- 
vide for the technology-specific recognit ion of current  digital 
signature technology, in part because that technology might 
one day no longer provide adequate security. Technological 
progress might lead to a situation where  the current  form of 
public key cryptography discussed above no longer ensures 
integrity and authenticity (for example,  because computer  
capacity rises to the point  where  it is possible rapidly to dis- 
cover a private key from the public  key or because certain 
encrypt ion algorithms no longer provide security because 
the mathematical problems underlying them are resolved). 
Moreover, specifically legislating for today's  t echnology  
would discourage the development  of new technologies.  
Thus, the European Commission and the Member States 
should  immedia te ly  begin  the  p rocess  of  identifying, 
analysing and cataloguing their  various legal requirements 
whereby  digital signatures and electronic documents  are dis- 
advantaged vis-h-vis their  traditional paper  counterparts .Then 
they need to undertake the difficult task of devising a new, 
harmonized, approach to such requirements that is no longer 
formulated in the terminology of  the traditional world of 
paper  documents  and that will accord appropr ia te  legal 
recognit ion to digital signatures and their technological 
descendants.  This standard should identify the requisite level 
of authenticity and integrity required for particular types of 
documents  (whether  traditional or  electronic) and establish 
technologically neutral standards according to which any 
manner  of providing the requisite authority and integrity will 
be accorded equal legal recognition. 17 
One important  question arising in this context  concerns  
the role of certification authorities. As the Communicat ion 
also acknowledges,  the legal effects of documents  signed 
with digital signatures may be implicitly linked to the trust- 
worthiness of  certification authorities. Indeed, to the extent  
certification authorities, for example,  ensure the connect ion 
be tween  the public key and the key holder, they enhance the 
value and trustworthiness of digital signatures. 
However, should the new legal standards (ment ioned 
above) governing the requisite level of  authenticity and 
integrity demand for every type of document  the involve- 
ment  of a certification authority? For example,  should the law 
require, as some have suggested, that an electronic document  
will qualify as a 'wri t ten document '  for evidentiary or  other  
purposes  only if it is accompanied by a digital signature that 
has been recognized by a certification authority that has ful- 
filled certain requirements governing its establishment and 
operation? In our  view, such a condit ion would seem mis- 
placed,  at least in certain contexts. For example,  companies  
that regularly do business with each other  electronically 
might well choose to do so by privately exchanging keys and 
avoiding the expense  and burden of  using a certification 
authority. It would seem inappropriate  to deny equal legal 
recogni t ion  to digitally s igned e lec t ronic  documen t s  
exchanged in such circumstances. Perhaps the law might pro- 
vide that digital signatures certified by a licensed certification 
authority would be accorded prima facie legal recognition, 
but it would allow those relying on other  digital signatures to 
prove their  validity by establishing the security and reliability 
of  the system and signature in question. 
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Electronic documents accompanied by certified digital 
signatures provide a much higher degree of authenticity and 
integrity than do most conventional documents accompanied 
by handwritten signatures.Thus, requiring an electronic doc- 
ument  to be accompanied by a digital signature certified by a 
certification authority before that document  would be 
accorded legal recognition would impose a much higher bur- 
den on digital signatures than has traditionally been imposed 
on conventional signatures. For many, perhaps most, electron- 
ic documents, it would seem inappropriate to impose such a 
high standard of authenticity and integrity. 
Indeed, requiring an electronic document to be accompa- 
riled by a digital signature certified by a certification authority 
would seem to be akin to requiring a hand-written signature to 
be notarized. In so far as not all conventional documents need 
be notarized in order for them to be valid or enforceable, why 
should electronic documents require the afftxation of a digital 
signature certified by a certification authority in order for them 
to be recognized? Perhaps an appropriate solution would be to 
require the involvement of a certification authority only in 
cases where the involvement of a notary would be required in 
the context of a conventional document and where communi- 
cations are made with public authorities such as tax and social 
security authorities. 
In any event, a functional, technology-neutral approach 
should be taken that provides courts with flexibility to 
accept new technological forms of providing authenticity 
and integrity. However, this approach is specifically formulat- 
ed, it should ensure (at least over the near term) that an elec- 
tronic document  will be accorded the same legal recognition 
as a traditional paper document  accompanied by a handwrit- 
ten signature if it is accompanied by a digital signature and a 
certificate issued by a certification authority established and 
operated according to the requisite standard. 
'Public' electronic documents might be deemed to fall 
within a special category, and perhaps they would be legally 
recognized only if accompanied by a certificate issued by a 
licensed certification authority. Although notaries are unlikely 
to welcome this prospect, one might ask whether certification 
authorities indeed have a vital 'notarial' role to fulfil in the digi- 
tal future, and whether certification authorities might take over 
much of the role of notaries in the electronic world. If so, how 
can we ensure that the licensing requirement is not used to 
limit the number of certification authorities, and thereby to 
restrict competition among certification authorities? 
REGULATION OF ENCRYPTION 
We now turn to the other main topic addressed by the 
Communication, namely encryption. Because encryption has 
been the topic of considerably more debate and commentary 
than have digital signatures, we will comment only briefly on 
this section of the Communication. 
As the Communication correctly recognizes, the develop- 
ment of electronic commerce and many other applications of 
the Information Society will depend on the ability cost-effEc- 
tively to maintain the confidentiality of electronic communica- 
tions, is The Communication provides several examples where 
this requirement of confidentiality is particularly clear, includ- 
ing tele-shopping and tele-banking (where consumers must be 
assured that personal data such as credit card numbers are kept 
conlldential); sensitive business communications such as pro- 
ject bids, research results, and the like (where companies must 
be protected against industrial espionage); and health care 
telematic applications (where patients must be protected 
against the unauthorized disclosure of their medical records). 
As noted above in the section introducing the technology, sym-  
m e t r i c  encryption systems are currently the main way of 
achieving the confidentiality of electronic communications. 
As most readers will already know, a lively debate has 
been under way regarding the regulation of encryption, and 
the Commission takes a clear and enlightened position with 
respect to the main issues in this debate. In particular, the 
Communication addresses the following issues: 
• Export control measures. 
• Domestic control measures. 
• Key escrow and key recovery systems. 
• Privacy considerations. 
Export Control Measures 
As the Communication notes, certain export controls have 
been imposed on encryption in an eflort to deny foreign 
opponen t s  the benefits of strong cryptography. 
Internationally, such controls have been imposed under the 
so-called Wassenaar arrangement, 19 which replaced the 
COCOM list. Exports of certain encryption technologies are 
controlled within the European Union under the Dual-Use 
Regulation of December 1994. 2o As pointed out by the 
( 'ommunication, in so far as the Dual-Use Regulation permits 
controls on shipments of cryptography products from one 
Member State to another, it can lead to distortions in the func- 
tioning of the Single Market. 
With respect to policy actions to be taken in the export 
control area, the Communication does not suggest any 
actions with respect to the Wassenaar arrangement, probably 
because the Commission did not wish to be seen to be 
exceeding the bounds of its authority in sensitive national 
security matters. However, the Communication does, fortu- 
nately, suggest that the Dual-Use Regulation should be liberal- 
ized. 2~ In particular, the Communica t ion  suggests the 
progressive elimination of intra-Community controls on com- 
mercial encryption products. 22 
Domestic Control Measures 
Compared with export controls on encryption, domestic 
control of encryption is, as the Commission notes, relatively 
rare.Among EU Member States, only France has a comprehen- 
sive cryptographic regulation. However, intense debates are 
under way in several European countries (and the United 
States) concerning the possibility of adopting such legisla- 
tion. As noted by the Communication, national law enforce- 
ment authorities and national security agencies favour 
domestic encryption controls because they fear that the 
widespread use of encrypted communications will diminish 
their ability to fight crime and prevent terrorism. 
The Communication notes that proposed domestic control 
mechanisms could make the use of encryption (or at least cer- 
tain forms of encryption) illegal unless it has been anthorized. 
Alternatively or additionally, supply and import of encryption 
products and services (or cer ta in  products and services, such 
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as those employing strong encryption) could be placed under 
an authorization scheme. The main aim of such regimes is to 
ensure that encryption available to users either is relatively 
weak (i.e. practically useless) or subject to legal access by gov- 
ernments through key escrow or similar schemes. 
The Communication is refreshingly blunt in its assess- 
ment of such domestic control mechanisms. Basically, it 
points out that such mechanisms would be futile and coun- 
terproductive. They would not prevent criminals from using 
effective encryption technology, but "could well prevent law- 
abiding companies and citizens from protecting themselves 
against criminal attacks'. 23 Moreover, such regulations could, 
by establishing different rules governing the use and sale of 
cncryption technologies, create obstacles to the functioning 
of the Single Market - -  and this provides an important consti- 
tutional basis for Commission initiatives in this area. In addi- 
tion, the formulation of laws regulating encryption will have a 
direct effect on privacy and freedom of speech and associa- 
tion.We can only hope that the Member States will realize the 
wisdom of the Commission's hands-off approach to encryp- 
tion regulation. 
Key escrow and key recovery systems 
Key escrow and key recovery systems are among the meth- 
ods that have been suggested for policing the use of encryp- 
tion in connect ion with illegal activities. Under a key escrow 
system, a copy of the relevant key would be provided either 
directly to a law enforcement agency or to a so-called 'trusted 
third party' that could be required to release the key to gov- 
ernment  agencies under  certain circumstances. Under a key 
recovery system, information about the key is provided to the 
government or the trusted third party that would allow the 
law enforcement agency to 'recover' the key if necessary to 
crack a message for police purposes. 
The Communication adopts an appropriately negative posi- 
tion with respect to key escrow and key recovery systems. As 
the Commission points out, 24 such systems would be ineffec- 
tive for law enforcement purposes, in so far as they would be 
easily circumvented. At the same time, key escrow and key 
recovery systems would significantly diminish the attractive- 
ness of encryption to users. Obviously, any involvement by a 
third party in confidential communication increases its vulner- 
ability, and thus diminishes trust in the confidentiality of elec- 
tronic communication. In this connection, serious privacy 
concerns arise as well. Moreover, key escrow and key recovery 
systems would impose significant costs on the use of encryp- 
tion, especially were such systems to be implemented on a 
global scale. In short, the adverse consequences flowing from 
the imposition of key recovery or escrow systems would, with- 
out providing any real law enforcement benefit, hinder the 
development of electronic commerce. 
Privacy 
While acknowledging that national security and law enforce- 
ment considerations can sometimes trump privacy rights, the 
Communication notes the importance of encryption to main- 
raining privacy. In particular by employing encryption meth- 
ods, 'data controllers' can fulfil their obligations under the EC 
Data Protection Directive to protect personal data. 
Most pointedly, the Communicat ion hints that the 
Commission might use the EC Data Protection Directive and 
the Commission's power to enforce EC rules on free move- 
ment of goods and services to attack certain legislation hinder- 
ing the use of encryption. As the Communication notes, the 
free flow of personal data throughout the Internal Market 
depends on the ability of encryption methods to 'travel' with 
the personal information they are securing. Thus, differing 
Member State rules regulating encryption could lead to obsta- 
cles in the flow of information, and thereby to the restrictions 
on the flow of goods and services among Member States. As 
the Communication puts it, "any regulation hindering the use 
of encryption products and services throughout the Internal 
Market thus hinders the secure and free flow of personal infor- 
mation and the provision of related go~xts and services". 25 
Commission's policy orientations 
In laying out its policy orientations on encryption, the 
Commission, while acknowledging the competence  of 
Member States with respect to national security and law 
enforcement, indicates that it may not hesitate to take action 
against encryption regulations that infringe EC law, including 
EC law on free movement of goods and services and data pro- 
tection. In this connection, the Communication notes that 
Member States are obligated to notify the Commission of new 
national rules that might create Internal Market obstacles, and 
indicates that such notifications might provide the basis for 
Commission action. 26 
This policy orientation is certainly to be welcomed. 
Undoubtedly the Commission is correct that there will be no 
internal market for electronic commerce without an internal 
market for cryptography. Harmonization of Member State rules 
on cryptography to avoid regulatory inconsistencies is vital, 
and the Commission has an essential role in achieving this task. 
In addition, the Communication's international orientation 
is important. As the Communication notes, the global nature of 
electronic commerce will require the European Community to 
seek an internationally compatible framework for digital signa- 
tures and encryption, including the establishment of interna- 
tional technical standards (necessary for interoperability) and 
mutual recognition of certificates on an international basis.We 
can hope that the Commission will promote its enlightened 
cryptography policy with its major trading partners, as well as 
in international organizations like the WTO and OECD. 
As far as its future programme is concerned ,  the 
Commission intends to organize an international hearing on 
the questions addressed in the Communicat ion during the 
first quarter of 1998 and to make a proposal for further 
action (perhaps including a directive on digital signatures) 
during the second quarter of 1998. Finally, and appropriate- 
ly ambitiously, the Communicat ion sets a target of the year 
2000 for establishment of a common European framework 
for cryptography. 
CONCLUSION 
A refreshing wind is blowing from Brussels. For the first time 
since the debate began over cryptography, an official govern- 
ment  communication has clearly acknowledged the need for 
the legal recognition of digital signatures on a global scale 
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and for the unhindered public availability of strong encryp- 
tion. Promptly implementing the policy objectives laid out in 
the Communication would establish some of the main condb 
tions to the deployment  of  electronic commerce  and the 
broader development  of the Information Society in Europe. 
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